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SETH MACINKO*

Public or Private?: United States
Commercial Fisheries
Management and the Public Trust
Doctrine, Reciprocal Challenges.
ABSTRACT
This article explores contemporary debates over property rights
in United States fisheries in the context of the public trust doctrine. The debate surrounding the privatization ofharvesting rights
in the halibut and sablefish fisheries off Alaska is used as a case
study. The public trust perspective guides a new reading of the
Alaska debate offering insight into current conceptualizations of
both property rights in fisheries and the public trust doctrine itself. A contextual analysis of the early public trust doctrine reveals a strong symmetry between the debate over the early doctrine
and that over the Alaska fisheries. Both are debates over fundamental ideas regarding the interrelationships between natural resources, rights, equity, progress and nationhood. A public
trust-driven reading of the Alaska debate reveals how much our
ideas about rights, and consequently about the public trust doctrine itself, have changed. In our quest for environmental preservation we have all but abandoned earlier emphasis on distributional
equity and the specificity of the early public trust doctrine in exchange for the malleability of current articulations of the doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to explore contemporary debates
over property rights in United States fisheries in the context of the public trust doctrine. The debate surrounding the privatization of harvesting rights in the halibut and sablefish fisheries off Alaska is used
as a case study. The public trust perspective guides a new reading of
the Alaska debate. This new reading presents substantial insight into
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current conceptualizations of both property rights in fisheries and the
public trust doctrine itself.
The article is presented in three parts. Part 1 introduces the debate over the halibut and sablefish fisheries off Alaska within the context of a more generalized debate over access to fisheries resources.
Part 2 focuses on the public trust doctrine and is presented in three
stages. First, a review of two cases, Arnold v. Mundy and Martin v. Waddell, establishes basic contours of the early public trust doctrine. Second, following the lead of the Supreme Court and recent commentators,
the discussion shifts to the context of the early cases. This contextual
analysis ties the public trust doctrine to 19th century debate between
progressivism and populism. Third, characterization of the early doctrine and its larger context provides an archetypal public trust issue
which is easily identified as the core of the Alaska debate. However,
the Alaska debate has not been considered from the perspective of the
public trust doctrine. Part 3 discusses why the connection between the
Alaska debate and the public trust doctrine has not been heretofore
recognized and explores the implications of the connection.
The focus is on ideas-and how protagonists in both the fisheries and public trust contexts perceive and articulate them-and their
context. This focus, and the basis of the argument which links the Alaska
debate and the public trust doctrine, is suggested by history. Early articulation of the public trust doctrine featured a concern for distributional equity and common rights based upon democratic ideals. Most
importantly, the early articulation of the doctrine was the product of
deliberate attention to ideology. This attention suggests
a reading of
1
the Alaska debate focused on ideological exchanges.
A public trust-driven reading of the Alaska debate reveals how
much our ideas about rights, and consequently about the public trust
doctrine itself, have changed. In our contemporary quest for environmental preservation we have all but abandoned emphasis on distributional equity. We have also abandoned the specificity of the early public
trust doctrine in exchange for the extreme malleability of current articulations of the doctrine. So malleable as to be amorphous, the public trust doctrine has, not unlike fisheries management, reached a critical
crossroads.
Part I: Privatization of Fisheries, An Introduction to the Problem
I have approved the individual fishing quota (IFQ) management program for the fixed gear fisheries for sablefish
and halibut developed by the Council ....
In approving the
1. Here, I refer to ideology quite literally in the dictionary sense of "the study of
ideas, their nature and source." Webster's New World Dictionary 696 (2d ed. 1974).
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amendments in their entirety, I commend the Council for its
dedicated pursuit of a policy that balances market-based allocation of fishery resources and social objectives. The sablefish and halibut IFQ program is progressive in seeking
improvements in efficiency, biological conservation, and
socio-economic stability in the affected fisheries while providing growth opportunities for under developed coastal
communities in western Alaska. This program should provide NMFS with the tools to protect both fishermen and the
resources from the excesses that stem from overcapitalizathe Council to continue its efforts in this
tion. I encourage
2
direction.
On January 29,1993 the Administrator of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) approved a plan to introduce privatized harvesting rights in the halibut and sablefish fisheries
off Alaska, ostensibly ending a decade of intense debate. 3 Two features
characterized the debate. First, the privatization plan reflects two interrelated intellectual histories of access to fisheries resources: 40 years
of fisheries economics, and the not always concordant history of fisheries management. The second feature of the Alaska debate is a sense
of deja vu. Neither the Alaska debate nor the larger access issue have
shifted appreciably in 40 years. A survey of the debate begins with the
generic contours of the fisheries access question and then moves to the
specifics of the Alaska debate.
a) Individual Transferable Quotas: Once Over Lightly
Students of fisheries management will recognize debate over
privatized harvesting rights as the latest episode in a protracted debate over "limited entry" as a fisheries management tool.4 Limited
entry is a response to the problems arising from unrestricted access
(open access) to fisheries resources. Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons metaphor serves as an adequate representation of the perceived
fundamental problems.5 Hardin's focus on the collective irrationality
2. Memorandum from J.Knauss, NOAA Administrator, to R. Lauber, Chairman, North
Pacific Fishery Management Council (Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with author).
3. The privatization plan approved by the NOAA Administrator was developed by
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council [hereinafter Council] as authorized by
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1851-53
(1988), Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat 331, 346 (1976) [hereinafter the Magnuson Act]. The
NOAA administrator holds the title of Under Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere,
Department of Commerce.
4. For an introduction to limited entry, see Limited Entry as a Fishery Management
Tool: Proceedings of a Conference to Consider Limited Entry as a Tool in Fishery
Management (R. Rettig & J. Ginter eds., 1978) [hereinafter Limited Entry].
5. G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968). The specific
development of the critique of open access will not be covered here. For the early
development see, e.g., H. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource:
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of individually rational action explains the appeal to limited entry to
effect economic rationalization.
Limited entry is designed to target perceived irrationalities in
so-called "derby style" open access fisheries. First there is a competitive "race for fish." 6 Second, this race spurs continual reinvestment (of
captured economic rent) in technology in pursuit of competitive advantage. The combined results are continued growth in the harvesting
power of the fleet and a consequent shortening of the fishing season.
These results have both economic and biological consequences that are
deemed undesirable. From the economist's viewpoint, the continual
reinvestment in harvesting effort (in a fleet already capable of harvesting
the permissible total catch) is the essence of "overcapitalization." Overcapitalization represents the tragedy of rent dissipation, an unnecessary diversion of capital and labor that could be released to more
productive sectors of the national economy. 7 From the biologist's perspective, the short seasons coupled with excessive harvesting power
require an uncomfortable level of precision in controlling that power
so as not to exceed prescribed harvests. From either perspective, management experience with open access has increasingly been characterized
by frustration and disappointment.8
The Fishery, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 124 (1954) and A. Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole
Ownership, 63 J. Pol. Econ. 116 (1955); for a review of theoretical developments, see A.
Scott, Development of Economic Theory on Fisheries Regulation, 36 J. Fisheries Res. Bd. Can.
725 (1979). It is particularly appropriate to use Hardin to condense the debate since so
much of the relevant literature utilizes Hardin's analysis as a kind of expressive shorthand.
The Council has been particularly notable in their appeal to Hardinesque imagery. For
example, the premier issue of True North (a Council newsletter designed to "present
upcoming changes, clear up misunderstandings, and help the industry prepare for new
management programs in North Pacific Fisheries") contained section headings entitled
Cowboys of the Benthic Plainand Fencing Off the Commons, True North (North Pacific Fishery
Mgmt. Council, Anchorage, AK), Sept. 1992, at 1, 2, and 8, respectively. For a more detailed
assessment of the influence of Hardin's model on another ITQ debate, see C. Creed,
Cutting Up the Pie: Private Moves and Public Debates in the Social Construction of a
Fishery 1 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University).
6. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Strategic Plan of the National Marine
Fisheries Service Goals and Objectives 1, 9 Oune 10, 1991) [hereinafter Strategic Plan).
For another use of this language, see infra text accompanying note 39. For a general
summary of the ills associated with the race, see A. Scott, Catch Quotas and Shares in the
Fishstockas Property Rights, in Natural Resource Economics and Policy Applications 61,
68-69 (E. Miles et al. eds., 1986).
7. See, e.g., A. Tussing, Introduction:Economics and Policy in Alaska Fisheries,in Alaska
Fisheries Policy: Economics, Resources, and Management 1, 8 (A. Tussing et al. eds.,
1972).
8. See, e.g., M. Miller et al., Impressions of Ocean Fisheries Management Under the
Magnuson Act, 21 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 263 (1990); Strategic Plan, supra note 6, at 11.
Industry opinion of open access is not so easy to characterize because of the nonhomogenous nature of the U.S. fishing industry. Note that open access does not necessarily
imply equal access; see S. Langdon, From Communal Propertyto Common Propertyto Limited
Entry: Historical Ironies in the Management of Southeast Alaska Salmon, in A Sea of Small
Boats 304, 314-24 (1. Cordell ed., 1989).
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In response to the problems associated with open access fisheries, fisheries economists identified a suite of possible remedial actions. 9 From this array, two broad categories of entry limitation are now
firmly established in the vocabulary of fisheries managers: license limitation and individual transferable quotas (ITQs). 10 License limitation
resembles taxicab medallions, where the total pool of participants is
fixed but each participant's share of the total allowable catch (TAC) is
not fixed. Each licensed participant competes directly against all other
licensees for a portion of the TAC. In contrast, ITQs are analogous to
stock market shares or to tradable emissions permits. Under an ITQ
system the total pool of participants is not fixed, but each participant's
share of the TAC is fixed by the amount of shares possessed.,' Typically, a participant's gross holding of shares is adjusted by buying and
selling shares in an open market.1 2
The differences between the two broad categories of limited entry
are responsible for a distinct evolution of management experience with
limited entry. License limitation schemes were tried first but have generally fallen from grace in favor of ITQs. 13 In practice, the results of license limitation have been disappointing from the economic
rationalization perspective. The very conditions thought to require amelioration-the race for fish and overcapitalization-are often exacerbated under license limitation. 14 ITQs are a theoretically informed
9. See, e.g., F. Christy, Jr., Alternative Entry Controls for Fisheries, in Limited Entry Into
the Commercial Fisheries 85 U. Mundt ed., 1975).
10. Note that various specific names have been attached to ITQ plans. The Alaska
plan refers to IFQs (individual fishing quotas); see Limited Access Management of
Fisheries Off Alaska, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,130,57,130 (1992) (proposed Dec. 3,1992) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule]. Note: As this article was going to press, the final rule was published;
see 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 204, 672, 675-76). For expositional
purposes, I have chosen to retain the generic term, ITQ, throughout this essay.
11. Because the total pool of participants is not fixed (i.e., entry is not fixed and, in
theory, participation levels could even rise), ITQs are often distinguished from limited
entry which is then regarded as synonymous with license limitation. This distinction is
not trivial particularly when "limited entry" has received a statutory blessing. I will not
pursue this point in this essay but my use of limited entry as generic term for expositional
purposes is not intended to demean the distinction. Strictly speaking, there is a cap on
the maximum and minimum number of participants under ITQ systems. The maximum
number is a function of the size of the individual quota shares relative to the overall
TAC. The minimum number is a function of any constraints on maximum allowable
holding of aggregate shares relative to the TAC. For example, the halibut plan amendment
specifies a cap of 0.5 percent of the total TAC for most of the exclusive fishing areas
designated in the plan, thus the number of participants could conceivably be reduced
to 200; see Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 57,137.
12. Assuming the shares are "transferable," see infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
13. See, e.g., P. Copes, A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries
Management, 62 Land Econ. 278 (1986).
14. See, e.g., K. Schelle & B. Muse, Efficiency and Distributional Aspects ofAlaska's Limited
Entry Program, in Fishery Access Control Problems Worldwide 317, 325-26, 328-29 (N.
Mollett ed., 1986). Recent discussions have tended to lump license limitation with open
access in terms of the inability to address these problems; see, e.g., South Atlantic Fishery
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response to the record of license limitation. In theory, ITQs would permit harvesters to temporally spread their harvest activities to take advantage of market demand conditions and to engage in other
15
profit-maximizing measures including reductions in operating costs.
Despite this theoretical promise, opposition to ITQs has been
substantial, 16 and has been rooted in two conceptually distinct questions. The first questions whether ITQs will work. 17 The second ostensibly 18accepts the theory but questions its implications if it does
"work." The limited empirical record of ITQ management appears
to support the expectations of its proponents. 19 Empirical support,
however, has done little to quell opposition to ITQs. Opposition is
based on the realization that any form of access control, and any alteration in an existing pattern of access control, represents a specific
20
allocation of benefits that advantages some participants over others.
Thus, the characteristic concern associated with limited entry gener21
ally has been focused on the implications for distributional equity.
Distributional equity concerns typically arise in response to a
pattern of four critical choices in the design of limited entry systems. 22
The first critical choice involves the qualification criteria for identifying recipients of the harvesting privileges (for example, should vessel
ownership be a necessary condition, and if so, during what period of
time?). The second critical choice involves the method of disbursement
of harvest privileges: are the privileges simply granted to initial recipients or is some payment exacted from the recipients? The third critical choice follows from the second: for how long are the privileges
granted, that is, is there to be periodic consideration of the exaction
question or is the disbursement of privileges a one-time event? The
Management Council, Final Amendment 5 (Wreckfish), Regulatory Impact Review, Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Determination and Environmental Assessment for the Fishery
Management Plan for the Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South Atlantic Region 20-21,
49 (Sept. 1991). See also Copes, supra note 13, at 278.
15. See Copes, supra note 13, at 279-80.
16. One measure of the contentiousness of ITQs, and limited entry generally, is the
unending series of conferences, and subsequent published proceedings, devoted to them.
A partial list includes: Mundt, supra note 9; Limited Entry, supra note 4; Proceedings of
the Conference on Fisheries Management: Issues and Options (T. Frady ed., 1985)
[hereinafter Issues & Options]; Mollett, supra note 14; and Rights Based Fishing (P.Neher
et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Rights Based Fishing].
17. See, e.g., Copes, supra note 13, at 281-88.
18. This form of opposition increasingly dominated the Alaska debate; see infra text
accompanying notes 55-71.
19. See R. Boyd & C. Dewees, Putting theory into practice: Individual transferable quotas
in New Zealand'sfisheries, 5 Soc'y &Nat. Resources 179. Boyd & Dewees, id. at 180, respond
directly to the a prioriapproach of Copes, supra note 13.
20. For a compelling account of the opportunistic utilization of property law in
connection with fisheries access questions, see Langdon, supra note 8.
21. See T. Morehouse & J. Hession, Politics and Management: The Problem of Limited
Entry, in Tussing et al., supra note 7, at 279, 285-88.
22. A complementary and somewhat more expansive discussion of critical design
choices appears in Tussing, supra note 7, at 10-11.
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fourth critical choice concerns transferability: do the privileges revert
back to the sanctioning regime when a recipient exits the fishery (nontransferability), or may recipients exchange their privileges for remu-

nerative gain in the open market (transferability)? The prevailing United
States experience with limited entry is that transferable privileges are
given in perpetuity free of charge to qualifying vessel owners. 23 Transferability in particular produces a conspicuous result: harvest privileges acquire a market value with a demonstrated capacity for rapid
24
escalation.

The specter of high market values is directly or indirectly as-

sociated with four idealized concerns: 25 1) the basic equity involved in
the apparent give-away of a public resource to a few individuals who

stand to collect a sizable windfall;26 2) intergenerational equity-will
high entry costs present a prohibitive barrier to future generations?; 3)

the potential transfer and consolidation of the industry into the hands
of large capital owners at the expense of small-scale participants; and
4) the combined impact of the above concerns on fisheries-dependent
coastal communities.

Finally, the general debate is largely bi-modal and polarized.
Proponents of limited entry tend to regard opponents as the embodiment of Machiavellian self-interest acting to preserve a status quo that
impedes progressive resource management.27 At the other extreme,opponents tend toward Proudhon's view that property is theft and regard proponents as meddlesome social engineers tackling a non-existent
problem ("if it ain't broke, don't fix it"). 28
23. The "in perpetuity" characterization is disputed by those apprehensive of takings
questions. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
24. For example, under Alaska's license limitation plan for the state's salmon fisheries,
the 1993 market value of a permit (license) for the Chignik (seine) and False Pass (drift
gill net) registration areas was approximately $400,000 (see Box Score, Pacific Fishing,
Sept. 1993, at 60). Note that market values may decline but the free initial endowment
means that while subsequent purchasers may lose money, the initial recipients always
gain by the sale of their formerly free harvest privileges.
25. Variations on these generalized concerns can be found in almost any consideration
of limited entry; see, e.g., B.Cicin-Sain, EvaluativeCriteriafor Making Limited Entry Decisions,
in Limited Entry, supra note 4, at 230, 244-47.
26. This concern has been expressed as a concern for the state induced creation of a
"millionaires club"; see Limited Entry, supra note 4, at 121-23.
27. This dichotomy is not as reckless an act of reductionism as it might first appear.
Proponents of limited entry tend to transform concern for distributional equity into resolute
opposition to limited entry. Thus, the dichotomy is created by the participants themselves.
For an illustrative example of such social construction, see J. Crutchfield, Economic and
Social Implicationsof the Main Policy Alternativesfor ControllingFishingEffort, 36 J. Fisheries
Res. Bd. Can. 742, 750-51. On the Machiavellian nature of opponents, see Rights Based
Fishing, supra note 16, at 1.
28. Ironically, while opponents decry the social engineering of limited entry and
proponents lament the social engineering that maintains open access, neither side appears
to recognize that all fisheries management is social engineering; see, e.g., open discussion
in Issues & Options, supra note 16, at 350-52, 356.
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The extremes of the debate, like the particulars of the critique
of open access, were well established by the 1970s and are periodically
rearticulated as new fisheries and new fisheries managers encounter
the difficulties posed by open access, but little new dialogue has entered the general debate over limited entry and ITQs. 29 The next task
is to compare the broad contours of the general debate to the specific
debate over the halibut and sablefish fisheries off the coast of Alaska.
b) ITQs: Alaska as a Case in Point
The commercial fisheries off of Alaska for Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and sablefish (Anoplopomafimbria)are distinct, but
were eventually considered under a single composite ITQ management
plan.3 ' The Alaska halibut fishery began in the 1890s, the sablefish fish29. This stagnation is easily discernible in a chronological reading of the "great books"
on limited entry; see supra note 16.
30. A collection of documents and the public comments they inspired provide the
core "text" for a reading of the debate over ITQs. The development of the ITQ plan is
traced by a series of Council documents produced since 1989. Collectively, these documents
form the complete Environmental Impact Statement submitted for review under
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). In chronological order
these documents are: (1) North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Draft Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement and Regulatory Impact Review/Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis to the Fishery Management Plans for the Gulf of Alaska and the
Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (Nov. 16, 1989) [hereinafter SEIS]; (2) North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, Revised Supplement to the Draft Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement and Regulatory Impact Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
to the Groundfish Fishery Management Plans for the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands (May, 13, 1991) [hereinafter SSEIS]; (3) North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Regulatory Impact
Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for Proposed Individual Fishing Quota
Management Alternatives for the Halibut Fisheries in the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter DEIS]; and (4) North Pacific Fishery
Management Council, Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental
Impact Statement for the Individual Fishing Quota Management Alternative for Fixed
Gear Sablefish and Halibut Fisheries Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands
(Sept. 15,1992) Ihereinafter FEIS]. The FEIS also refers to an undated original supplement
to the SEIS which was revised and released as the SSEIS mentioned above; see FEIS,
supra, at 1-1, 1-3. The DEIS states that this original supplement to the SEIS was released
for public review in May, 1990; DEIS, supra, at 1-3. Not mentioned as part of the official
NEPA submission is yet another supplemental analysis, North Pacific Fishery Management
Council, Draft Supplemental Analysis of the Individual Fishing Quota Management
Alternative for Fixed Gear Sablefish and Halibut Fisheries Gulf of Alaska and Bering
Sea/Aleutian Islands (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter DSEIS]. Note that the Council selected
the current plan for ITQ management on Dec. 8, 1991 (see DSEIS, supra, at 1-1), thus,
several of the NEPA related analyses were conducted after the Council's final decision
on the structure of the plan had been made. Note too, that initially the sablefish and
halibut fisheries were treated separately. It is hard to even contemplate navigating
through this maze of supplements and supplements to supplements without recalling
the argument that the opportunity cost of NEPA (in terms of the diversion of attention
and talent to record building) is a "disaster" for natural resources management; see S.
Fairfax, A Disasterin the Environmental Movement, 199 Science 743 (1978).
In addition to the NEPA related documents, the official compilation of public comment
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ery in 1906.31 Both fisheries occur throughout the Gulf of Alaska and
the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands with the majority of the harvests taken
from the central Gulf region surrounding Kodiak Island. 32 The halibut
fishery is managed by the International Pacific Halibut Commission,
but the authority to implement limited entry is vested in the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council).33 The Council formulates
management policy on all aspects of the sablefish fishery.
There is a considerable difference in the scale of the two fisheries. In 1990 in the central Gulf area, 2,734 vessels landed 37.8 million
pounds of halibut compared to 398 vessels landing 23.7 million pounds
of sablefish.34 Halibut are caught entirely with hook-and-line gear (primarily longline gear), and while pots and trawl gear are used in the
sablefish fishery, longlining accounts for a majority of the sablefish harvest. 35 In the halibut fishery in particular, a distinct division of the fleet
exists between relatively small vessels from Alaskan ports that target
halibut as one of many fisheries throughout the year, and larger vesarea that traditionally relied more exclusively on
sels from the Seattle
36
the halibut fishery.
The halibut and sablefish fisheries epitomize the general debate along the dimensions described above: 1) problem diagnosis; 2)
prescriptive response; and 3) subsequent polarized, stalled debate focused on equity/productivity tradeoffs. If there is one feature that distinguishes the specific from the general case it is the tendency to push
letters received in response to the publication of the proposed rules in the Federal
Register (see Proposed Rule, supra note 10) forms an essential element in the reading of
the debate. This compilation was provided to the NOAA Administrator for consideration
during his evaluation of the ITQ proposal (copies of comment letters are on file with the
author and with the National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Region, Juneau, AK)
[hereinafter Rule Comments; comment letters are identified by the number assigned by
the Alaska Region to each letter as it was received]. Other sources such as newspapers
and the Council's own informational publication, True North, supra note 5, contribute
to the reading of the debate.
31. DEIS, supra note 30, at 1-1 and SEIS, supra note 30, at 27.
32. See SEIS, supra note 30, at 29 (Fig. 3.1), 34 (Table 3.4) and DEIS, supra note 30, at
3-2 (Fig. 3.1), 3-3 (Table 3.1)
33. The Council's authority was established by the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of
1982, 16 U.S.C. § 773c(c).
34. The halibut numbers represent the sum of management areas 3A and 3B (DEIS,
supra note 30, at 3-6 (Table 3.2)). Sablefish data are from the SSEIS, supra note 30, at 2-2
(Table 2.1) with landings converted from metric tons.
35. The longline method consists of setting a main ground line on the sea bed with
anchors and surface markers on each end of the groundline. Baited hooks are attached
by short leaders (gangions) to the groundline at evenly spaced intervals. Traditionally,
the gangions are spliced directly into the ground line but there has been continued growth
in the popularity of "snap on" gear in which the gangions are attached to the ground
line via metal clothes-pin-like devices.
36. This is a reduction of the tripartite fleet typology offered in the DEIS, supra note
30, at 5-46. Much of the modern Seattle fleet has diversified, relying on other longline
fisheries (Pacific cod, sablefish, and rockfish) in addition to the halibut fishery.
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these dimensions to extremes in the specific case. The halibut fishery
in particular presents a classic example of the dilemma of open access.
The fishing season in the central Gulf area was reduced from 47 days
in 1977 to 3 days in 1990. 37 In the same area the fleet expanded from
1,692 vessels in 1984 to 2,347 vessels in 1990.38 This had the effect of
reducing the Alaska debate to a caricature of the general debate. What
theoretical subtleties there were in the standard critique of open access were displaced by hyperbolic invocations of Hardinesque imagery:
The race for fish leaves no time to think about responsible use of the resources, about decreasing bycatch, about creative new uses for byproducts or even about basic safety, as
we are tragically reminded each time a boat sinks. As the
dance floor's gotten more crowded, the music's picked up
its pace. Open access gives the fleet flexibility, but it doesn't
promote personal stewardship of the resource. If one fisherman backs off for conservation reasons, there are two more
pushing to take his place. Faced with intensifying pressure,
fishermen have no incentive to conserve and every reason
to fish as hard39 and fast and frantically as they can before the
curtain falls.
The prescriptive response to the problem was typical both in
terms of its long gestation period and its specific form. The Council
had become "concerned about a rapidly expanding halibut fleet" as
early as 1978.40 By 1983, the Council was considering a detailed assessment of the potential benefits of ITQ management in the halibut
fishery and attempted to place a moratorium on new entry into the
fishery.41 In 1985, after a two-year lull in interest, the Council initiated
the planning process that culminated with the current plans. 42 By September 1992, Council staff noted that the subject of ITQs had been on
the agenda of every Council meeting since 1988. 4 3 The specifics of the
37. DEIS, supra note 30, at 1-7 (referring only to area 3A). This temporal compression
is all the more pronounced given that the total harvest (for all areas) in 1977 was 21.9

million pounds versus 61.2 million pounds in 1990; id. at 2-12.
38. Id. at 3-3 (again for area 3A). The fleet size data presented in the EIS documents
begins with 1984 thus precluding parallel construction with the season length data
beginning in 1977.
39. True North, supra note 5, at 3.
40. DEIS, supra note 30, at 1-1.
41. See R. Stokes, North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Council Doc, 20,
Limited Entry in the Pacific Halibut Fishery: The Individual Quota Option (Dec. 1983),
and, regarding the failed moratorium, see H. Richards & A. Gorham, The Demise of the
U.S. Halibut Fishery Moratorium:A review of the controversy, in Mollett, supra note 14, at
33. See also DEIS, supra note 30, at 1-2.
42. FEIS, supra note 30, at 1-2.
43. In total, as of their April 1992 meeting, the Council had considered the general
question of limited entry for the halibut and/or sablefish fisheries during twenty-seven
meetings; see FEIS, supra note 30, at 1-4. The Council generally meets on a bi-monthly

schedule.
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ITQ plan mimic those outlined for the general case, opting for transduration that are initially allocated free of
ferable quotas of unlimited
44
charge to vessel owners.
Notably, the ITQ plan responded, through several measures, to
generic distributional equity concerns. Transferability between vessel
size classes was constrained to protect the traditional small boat character of much of the Alaskan fleet. 45 The total quotas any one entity
could hold were capped to limit fleet consolidation expected under ITQ
management. 46 Despite these concessions to equity concerns, opposition to the plan was broad and extreme, even by the generous standards of generic limited entry debates. The list of opponents included
principal coastal cities,4 7 a coastal municipal league,48 the Alaska House
50
of Representatives, 49 members of Alaska's congressional delegation,
Alaska Native organizations,5 1 a national environmental group focused
44. On the design decisions, see Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 57,133-139; see also
FEIS, supra note 30, at 2-22 to -47. Although no limitation on durability is specified, the
permanency of the quotas is a matter of some dispute; see text accompanying note 126
infra.
45. See Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 57,136.
46. Id. at 57,137.
47. See Letter from F. Wallace, Mayor, City of Haines, to R. Berg, National Marine
Fisheries Service (Dec. 22, 1992); Resolution No. 92-508, City of Sitka (June 23, 1992);
Resolution 92-11, City of Yakutat (Apr. 7, 1992); Resolution 1992-4, City of Pelican (Apr.
6, 1992); and Letter (with comments) from J.Selby, Mayor, Kodiak Island Borough, to R.
Berg, National Marine Fisheries Service (Jan. 11, 1993) (all letters and resolutions can be
found in Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter nos. 34, 59, and 78).
48. The Southwest Alaska Municipal Conference "is comprised of 105 communities,
businesses, Native organizations and nonprofits located or doing business in the Aleutians,
Pribilofs, Kodiak Island and Bristol Bay areas" (Letter from R. Wilson, President, Southwest
Alaska Municipal Conference, to R. Lauber, Chairman, North Pacific Fishery Management
Council (July 28, 1992) (on file with author). The Conference's opposition to the ITQ
plans is presented in Resolution 92-11 (Jan. 19, 1992); see Rule Comments, supra note 30,
at letter no. 60.
49. The Alaska House of Representatives passed H.J.R. No. 61 ("opposing Individual
Fishery Quota management systems for the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries and
other Alaska fisheries") by a unanimous vote on Mar. 13, 1992. A companion version of
the resolution never reached a vote in the Alaska Senate. For a copy of the resolution,
see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter no. 59.
50. Representative D. Young expressed outright opposition; see Letter from Rep. D.
Young to B. Franklin, Secretary of Commerce (Dec. 22, 1992); see Rule Comments, supra
note 30, at letter no. 92. Senator T. Stevens did not explicitly oppose the plan but did
express strong concerns over: a) the lack of thorough economic and social impact analyses
prior to final decisions, b) inadequate attention to the nature and the value of the
ownership interest created by the ITQs, and c) the lack of a detailed specification of the
likely funding required to effect the plan and intended sources for such funding; see
Letter from Sen. T. Stevens to B. Franklin, Secretary of Commerce (Dec. 21, 1992); see
Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter no. 99.
51. See Letter from F. Elvsaas, President, Seldovia Village Tribe and Seldovia Native
Association, Inc., to North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Dec. 5, 1991), and Open
Letter from J. Feller, Jr., Subsistence Advisory Board Chairman, Wrangell Cooperative
Association (reporting unanimous Tribal Council vote against the ITQ plan on Jan. 5,
1992); see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter nos. 53 and 59 respectively.
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on marine conservation,5 2 and the Council's own industry advisory
panel.5 3
In general, this opposition represented heightened but familiar concern for the equity/productivity exchange at the core of all debate over limited entry. The essence of this exchange was established
by the early 1980s:
I wonder what the effect the share quota systems ...
[would have on] Alaska's coastal communities or indus55
tries.
Well, I suppose I don't know. To some extent, I'd like those
questions to be on the other side of the ledger. What I'm interested in and what I think we need to focus our attention
on is the aggregate effect over the entire United States economy, initially ignoring the question of how particular groups,
56
and particular individuals and particular regions come out.
You know the political system as well as I do. There's no
shortage of opportunity for you to raise the issue of how is
57
this and how is that community going to come out.
Within this argument though, there were important aspects of
the Alaska debate that were qualitatively different from previous limited entry debates. On the proponents' side, there were pockets of extreme candor revealing central motivations behind the plan and the
intended beneficiaries. The ITQ plan's singular therapeutic feature, com52. In a turn around from earlier general support for the ITQ concept, the Center for
Marine Conservation came out with a late statement of opposition to the specific plan
adopted by the Council. See Letter from D. Allison, Fisheries Conservation Program Director,
Center for Marine Conservation, to R. Berg, National Marine Fisheries Service (Jan. 11,
1993); see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter no. 91. For early endorsement of ITQs,
see R. Wieland, Center for Marine Conservation, Why People Catch Too Many Fish 1,
48-49 (1992). Note that given the pamphlet's subtitle, "a discussion of fishing and
economic incentives," one might have expected the title to read "why too many people
catch fish."
53. Under the Magnuson Act, the regional councils are directed to "establish and
maintain a fishing industry advisory committee which shall provide information and
recommendations on, and assist in the development of, fishery management plans and
amendments to such plans"; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(g)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1993). The Council's
advisory panel recommended that the Council abandon the ITQ plan; Telephone Interview
with C. Oliver, Deputy Director, North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Apr. 26,
1993).
54. Typically the trade-off is seen as one between economic efficiency and equity but
economic productivity is the target in sight. On the significance of the generally overlooked
distinction between economic efficiency and productivity, see E. Saraydar, The Conflation
of Productivity and Efficiency in Economics and Economic History, 5 Econ. & Phil. 55 (1989).
For an application of the distinction to natural resources policy, see D. Bromley, The
Ideology of Efficiency, 19 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 86 (1990).
55. D. Herrnsteen, Commercial Fisherman and ex-Borough Mayor, Kodiak, panel
discussant in Issues & Options, supra note 16, at 145.
56. R. Stokes, Economist, University of Washington, panel discussant in Issues &
Options, supra note 16, at 145.
57. Id. at 146.
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pared to other alternatives, was its ability to ameliorate the tragedy of
rent dissipation. 8 This economic focus was in turn incorporated into
a rationale that stressed the diciplinary comfort of fisheries biologists
as much as any putative biological gains:
The primary role of a fishery manager should be [to] regulate such matters as total allowable catch, minimum size, allowable bycatch, opening and closings of fishing seasons and
other matters that directly address the biological issues of
fishery management.
I am uncomfortable in making detailed social and economic
decisions that allocate fish between different parts of the industry. On the other hand, I question the desirability of managing a fishery like our west coast halibut fishery in a way
that may make good biological sense, but appears to make
such little economic sense ....

We must limit access to the

59
resource in some manner. I wish it were otherwise.
The entire debate also revealed a lack of interest in the racial
diversity within Alaskan fisheries. After a decade of planning, it was
still possible to state that "[tihe participation of Alaska Natives in the
commercial fishery for halibut on and around Kodiak Island is not

known."60

On the opponents' side, new arguments surfaced in response
to the decision to award the quotas to vessel owners exclusively. Opponents railed against the privileging of capital as an equity issue, declaring "[t]he boat owners bought fishing boats not a fishery." 6 1 They
objected to the preferencing of capital over labor they perceived in the
allocation scheme:
The problem with the initial quota share assignment as it is
currently proposed is that it awards 100 percent of the total
qualifying poundage (used to determine shares) to vessel owners .... [This] completely ignores the legal ownership of por-

tions of the qualifying poundage by for-hire skippers and
58. Early on the Council noted that "traditional open access management tools could

solve or at least improve all of these problems with the exception of excess harvesting
capacity," see SEIS, supra note 30, at 175. In the same passage, the Council displayed the
enormous power to steer policy that accompanies the power to define both problems
and prospective remedies: "However, since it is not known how the Council will use
these [traditional] measures, only a continuation of [1] the status quo, [2] open access
management with annual fishing allotments, and [31 the imposition of limited access
are compared." Id. See also SSEIS, supra note 30, at 1-9.
59. NOAA Administrator J. Knauss, The State of the Worlds Marine Resources,
Address at the World Fisheries Congress, Athens, Greece (May 4, 1992) (transcript on
file with author).
60. DEIS, supra note 30, at 5-43.
61. L. Cooper, Executive Director of the North Pacific Fisheries Protective Association,
Letter to the Editor, Alaska Fishermen's J., June 1991, at 20, 54.
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crew members ... [Mlere expedience does not excuse the
moral and legal theft of commercial fishermen's share of halof those stolen goods to vesibut quotas and the distribution
62
sel owners for all time.
In addition to immediate distributional effects, the allocation
scheme presented long term implications for labor/capital relations
within the affected fisheries. First, the labor pool necessary under ITQ
management was projected to shrink by more than 85 percent due to
fleet consolidation and pooling of owner labor.63 Second, the "mil64
lionaires club" effect introduces a significant increase in entry costs.
The combined effect on the traditional occupational advancement path
from back deck to skipper's chair to boat owner was not lost on opponents who identified an implicit sexism in the allocation scheme's
impact on labor/capital relations:
It takes time to be able to build up the experience necessary and acquire the finances to be able to participate in a
fishery in any more than a deckhand capacity. These problems are faced by anyone wishing to break into a fishery.
Women also face a great deal of prejudice both in the fishing industry and the financial community. The current IFQ
proposal locks out women and many native fishermen. The
early years' credit for participation in receiving initial allocations locks in the white male 'good ole boys club' of vessel owners with effective ownership of the resource. The
price of IFQs will be prohibitive for minority deckhands to
even acquire the rights being granted to these vessel owners. Do not legitimize the injustices of a system65 that is already full of barriers to women and minorities.
Proponents of the plan did not respond to this particular aspect of the labor/capital issue. They did offer a succinct rationale for
the basic preferencing of capital:
62. Written testimony submitted by G. Plagenz to the North Pacific Fishery Management
Council (Nov. 25, 1991). This testimony is attached to Mr. Plagenz' comment letter
submitted during the proposed rule comment period; see Rule Comments, supra note 30,
at letter no. 64.
63. This estimate is for the halibut fishery and was derived from a model of the

fishery fully adjusted to ITQ management and a 50 day season; see FEIS, supra note 30,
at 2-10. Of course this is just a theoretical estimate but the debate was largely over just
what the theory behind ITQs meant. The pace and extent of actual consolidation occurring
under ITQ management of the mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery has surprised many
observers; see K. Moore, Individual Quota Plan Shrinks Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam Fleet, Nat'l
Fisherman, Mar. 1993, at 26-27.
64. On the millionaires club effect, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.

65. Letter from T. Seaton, Homer, AK, to R. Berg, National Marine Fisheries Service
(undated); see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter no. 77. For other comments
regarding the recent entry of women into the fisheries and the plan's inherent sexism,
see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter nos. 64 and 68.
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The Council made the decision that the appropriate recipients of the limited entry fishing privileges created by this
program were the vessel owners or leaseholders of vessels
who undertook the financial investment and risk in these fisheries. Skippers and crewmen were paid for their work. 66
Like the opponents, proponents of the ITQ plan were concerned
with potential alterations to existing labor/capital relations, but the
proponents sought to avoid advantaging-not disadvantaging-labor.
Including crew members among the initial recipients of quota shares
would "have the potential to increase the bargaining position of crew
relative to owners." 67 "The Council did not want 68to disrupt the complex business relationships among these groups."
New aspects of the Alaska debate did not dislodge it from the
characteristic pattern of limited entry debates. In particular, the debate
became extremely polarized as the decade-long saga neared a climax.
Opponents increasingly viewed the apparently intransigent commitment of the proponents as something of a conspiracy. Proponents, meanwhile, appeared to increasingly view opponents as desperate
obstructionists. 69 Extreme positions were voiced with extreme rhetoric.
At one extreme lay the conspiracy theorists: "This is not conservation
.... These proceedings are an absolute crime. A crime against human-

ity."70 "The Council continues to reject other more equitable proposals
the fishery from the American people and give it to
as they try to steal
71
a greedy few."
The other extreme vilified opponents of the plan:
It is difficult to understand the logic of their opposition, unless it is just selfishness ... In my opinion as vice chairman

of the Council, if you don't have a substitute plan in writing, and haven't participated through the public process, you
66. FEIS, supra note 30, at 12 App. E (responses to comments received during the
NEPA review, response to comment no. 12).
67. FEIS, supra note 30, at 2-22.
68. FEIS, supra note 30, at 7-3. Note that the concern reflected in this quotation was
specifically directed at four groups: vessel owners, permit holders, crew, and processors.
69. These views are displayed in the comments and responses accompanying the

final environmental impact statement; see id. at Apps. E & F. A palpable sense of frustration,
exasperation, and loss of patience-in short the sense that the Council and Council staff
were simply fed up with the opponents' litany of complaints and concerns-pervades
the responses.

70. Letter from S. Rutter, Sitka, AK, to B.Franklin, Secretary of Commerce (undated);
see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter no. 96.
71. Letter from P. Soileau, longline fisherman, to B. Franklin, Secretary of Commerce
(Dec. 6, 1992); see Rule Comments, supra note 30, at letter no. 84. Note that Soileau was
running the vessel Nettie H when it vanished en route to a crab fishery in the fall of 1993.
All hands on board, including two of Soileau's brothers, are presumed to have perished
in the incident. See B. King, Nettie H Lost in Bering Sea, Alaska Fishermen's J., Nov. 1993,
at 1.
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are at cross purposes with the fisheries managers and out of
72
touch with the professional longline fishermen in Alaska.
Is it possible to give the Alaska debate another reading? In particular, is it possible to locate within opposition to the proposed ITQ
scheme something more substantive than short-term self-interest? It is
suggested that an alternative reading is possible, one which debates
fundamental ideas regarding the interrelationships between natural resources, rights, equity, progress and nationhood. We can arrive at this
reading, and improve'the stagnant limited entry dialogue, by recasting the issues on a framework which has been, surprisingly, ignored:
the public trust doctrine. The effort to exhume the public trust framework has three components. First, the relevance of the public trust doctrine to fisheries access questions is noted. Second, the dimensions of
early public trust cases are charted. Third, the context of the early public trust doctrine is considered. The public trust doctrine provides an
archetype against which the Alaska debate may be measured.
Part 2: Of Rights and Resources: The Public Trust Point of View
a) Why look to the public trust?
A simple observation launches an alternative consideration of
limited entry debates and the Alaska debate in particular. Limited entry
debates focus on access rights, specifically on proposed alterations to
the prevailing concept of open access to fisheries resources. A logical
point of departure is to inquire why open access has prevailed up until
the relatively recent advent of limited entry programs. The answer to
that question for domestic coastal fisheries is found in the public trust
72. R. Alverson, Manager, Fishing Vessel Owners Ass'n, Seattle, WA, Letter to Senator
T. Stevens, Alaska Fishermen's J., Dec. 1992, at 22, 50. Alverson was vice chairman of the
Council during the final development of the ITQ plan. The Fishing Vessel Owners
Association represents much of the Seattle longline fleet participating in the halibut and
sablefish fisheries. In the first part of the quotation, Alverson is directly referring to the
opposition of Kodiak and Sand Point vessel owners. In the second part of the quotation,
Alverson is responding to Senator Stevens' having put "forward so many issues of
concern" without sitting "through a hearing on the issues." Alverson also raises the issue
of Stevens' accountability for fatalities occurring under the present open access system:
"Politicians who choose to slow down or impede the IFQ program need to begin justifying
the death certificates and emotional pain resulting from the status quo regulations." Id.
at 50.
73. Open access to fisheries resources has two distinct roots. One root-the public
trust doctrine-is little noted yet manifests the core of the limited entry debates. The
other root is often noted in the context of limited entry debates and is associated with
the writings of Hugo Grotius, fishing on the high seas, international law of the sea, and
industrial development. See H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (R. Magoffin trans., 1916) (1609).
This root, because of its high seas focus and reliance on notions of inexhaustibility of
ocean resources, is irrelevant to the core of the limited entry debates. For recognition of
Grotius' influence and the connection between his notion of freedom of the seas and the
so-called common property nature of marine fisheries, see F. Christy, Jr. & A. Scott, The
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doctrine. The public trust doctrine 73is associated with nearshore fisheries and domestic political theory.
The origins and evolution of the public trust doctrine have been
extensively explored elsewhere. 74 Here, it is necessary only to reiterate the most obvious contours of the doctrine: The doctrine represents
a constraint on alienation by a sovereign power of resources associated
with navigable waters. Traditionally, the doctrine has been tied to public use interests in commerce, navigation and fisheries. The general notion of a constraint on alienation and the connection to navigable waters
is traceable to Roman legal notions of common property (res communis) and resources not susceptible to conventional
ownership (res nul75
lius) and to provisions of Magna Charta.
American legal articulation of the public trust doctrine began
in cases involving fisheries access questions. 76 Four features of the original doctrine are relevant to the Alaska debate: 1) a distributional equity/common use rights nexus as an issue and the specific rhetoric
associated with this issue; 2) a perception of the profundity of the common use rights issue; 3) a conceptual distinction between use rights
and regulation; and 4) the role of contextual analysis in shaping these
features.
b) The Public Trust Doctrine: A Fishy Beginning.
Formal judicial articulation of the public trust doctrine is traced
to two key cases, the 1821 New Jersey Supreme Court case of Arnold v
Mundy, and the closely related 1842 United States Supreme Court case
Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries 1, 6-7, 178-79 (1965); see also J. McGoodwin, Crisis
in the World's Fisheries 1, 97-98 (1990). A. Scott, Conceptual Originsof Rights BasedFishing,
in Rights Based Fishing, supra note 16, at 11, 17-18, presents the more unusual treatment,
acknowledging Grotius while correctly attaching greater importance to the influence of
Magna Charta. For a systematic discussion of Grotius' influence, see J. Cordell, Introduction:
Sea Tenure, in A Sea of Small Boats 1, 11-13 (J.Cordell ed., 1989) (hereinafter Small Boatsi.
74. See, e.g., J. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes
Submerged TraditionalDoctrine,79 Yale L.J. 762 (1970); and J. Stevens, The Public Trust: A
Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 195 (1980). For surveys that are highly critical of the doctrine's origins, see G.
MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development,
Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 511
(1975), and P. Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1
Sea Grant L.J. 13 (1976).
75. See J. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 185, 185 (1980); see also Stevens, supra note 74, at 195-200. Note that such
gross generalization about the doctrine is perilous. Perhaps the key danger point regards
conflation of constraints on alienation with outright prohibition on alienation; see Sax,
supra note 74, at 486-89.
76. For the moment, the changing contours of the doctrine are not of primary interest.
I shall return to these changing contours in Part 3; see infra text accompanying notes 150161. The definitive work on the fisheries root of the public trust doctrine is B. McCay,
Public Trust and PrivateAlienation (forthcoming U. Ariz. Press).
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of Martin v Waddell.77 Arnold v Mundy addresses issues that are characteristic of early public trust cases: common use rights and title to
lands submerged beneath navigable waters. 78 The defendant was the
leader of a band of commoners who deliberately invaded the plaintiff's staked-off oyster bed "to try the right" of the plaintiff to claim an
exclusive fishing right, a right the defendant regarded as merely a "pretended right."79 While the court ostensibly viewed the case as a contest over the right to convey title to the submerged lands in Perth
Amboy, New Jersey,80 it ultimately answered the question by focusing
on the public and private use rights issues at the heart of the public
trust doctrine:
It is a fact as singular as it is unexpected in the jurisprudence
of our state, that the taking of a few bushels of oysters, alleged to be the property of the plaintiff in this suit, should
involve in it questions momentous in their nature as well as
in their magnitude... and embracing in their investigation,
the laws of nations and of England, the relative rights of sovereign and subjects,
as well as the municipal regulations of
81
our country.
The plaintiff claimed an exclusive fishing right tied to the right
of the proprietors of East Jersey to convey title to the relevant submerged lands.82 The defendant argued that the proprietors had no right
to convey title and thus the plaintiff had no basis to claim an exclusive
fishing right. The defendant's argument was based on distributional
equity and the common right
of all citizens of the state to take oysters
83
from the submerged lands.
i) Distributional Equity
The case was decided in favor of the defendant's assertion of
common rights of fishing and against the right of the proprietors to
convey submerged lands.8 4 Mundy's victory on the title question is
less important to the Alaska debate than its basis in common use rights
as an instrument of distributional equity.
77. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
The formative role of Arnold v.Mundy is acknowledged in such landmark public trust
cases as Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,456 (1892) and Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894).

78. The decision in Arnold v. Mundy specifically distinguishes between the legal
title and the usufruct (6 N.J.L. at 13). This distinction is echoed, for example, in Shively
v. Bowlby (on title, 152 U.S. at 9; on usufructuary rights, 152 U.S. at 11).
79. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 2, 66 (1821) (respectively).
80. "As to the right of the proprietors [of East Jersey] to convey. This is the great
question in the cause." Id. at 69-70.

81. Id. at 79.
82. Id. at 65-66.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id. at 76-78.
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Chief Justice Kirkpatrick explored the connection between common use rights and title rights in English and Roman legal traditions.
Kirkpatrick reasoned that if a tradition existed declaring some things
to be the common property of all, then the relevant sovereign (or representative) should be considered as "trustee to support the title for
the common use." 85 He found clear evidence of such a tradition, especially in post-Magna Charta England where he noted that Lord Hale
had written of "a public common [of) piscary."86 Kirkpatrick held that
lands under navigable water and the water over them were common
to all citizens for purposes of navigation, fishing, fowling, and sustenance: "the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in the sovereign, but it is vested in him, not for his own use, but for the use of the
citizen." 87 He then found that, upon the American Revolution, the people of New Jersey became the relevant sovereign impressed with "both
88
the legal title and the usufruct" of the submerged lands in question.
Kirkpatrick's consideration of class relations and distributional
equity is clear in his discussion of the gradual encroachment of English barons on common rights of access to submerged lands and associated fisheries.89 Arnold v Mundy was a pronouncement on the duty
of the state, as the representative of the people, to maintain common
use rights as an instrument of distributional equity. For the state, in its
regulatory capacity, to divest the citizens of their common rights "would
90
be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people."
The emphasis on equity and common use rights in turn provided the
core of a particular view of nationhood that is currently echoed in the
Alaska debate.
ii) An Ideal of Nationhood
It is hard to overemphasize the Justices' perception that the Arnold
case involved issues central to the very conceptualization of nationhood. Kirkpatrick's pronouncement on the potential grievance involved
in the alienation of common use rights is echoed in Justice Rossell's
concurring opinion:
[S]hall we, after the lapse of almost three centuries, insult
the memory of men [the founders of New Jersey] who were
an ornament to the human race, whose virtues have highly
85. Id. at 70.
86. Id. at 74.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 78.
89. Id. at 73-77. This attention to distributional equity and to the class elements of
the case is reinforced by the concurring opinion issued by Justice Rossell; Id. at 79-94,
see especially 91-93). Concerns for distributional equity and class relations have been called
the sources of the public trust doctrine; see Sax, supra note 75, at 189-92.
90. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 78.
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exalted their names, and whose labors have been a blessing
to the world, by saying they knew nothing of their privileges, and that their birthrights were lost forever in the forests
of New Jersey; that their boasted [M]agna [C]harta was a
farce from which they could derive no benefit; and that liberty, which they so highly valued, was confined to the grants
and concessions, or that our legislatures, from time to time
taking upon them to regulate fisheries of oysters, as well as
floating fish, for the public benefit, were totally ignorant of
their powers, overstepped the bounds prescribed by the constitution, to the destruction of the rights of individuals? I
think not.9 1
iii) Rights v. Regulation
The justices' comments on the national significance of the issues involved also address the third highlighted aspect of the case, the
distinction between the regulation of fisheries for the public benefit
and the use rights of individuals. Kirkpatrick's opinion was explicit
on this point, declaring the power of the state to regulate, the jus regium,
to be "wholly foreign" from the issues at stake in the case. 92 Thus, Arnold
v Mundy was grounded in a concern for the distributive aspect of common use rights, these rights were perceived as being fundamental to
the very character of the nation, and they were regarded as an issue
distinct from regulation. The fourth point of inquiry examines how the
justices were led to these perceptions.
iv) Context and the Construction of the Public Trust Doctrine
The justices' historical search through English and Roman law
for ideas about common property and its use reflects an embrace of
broad judicial construction. They looked to the context in which the
critical ideas about use rights were formed. 93 The state court's emphasis
on contextual analysis was subsequently echoed by the United States
Supreme Court.
The first United States Supreme Court case to examine the public trust doctrine also focused on access to oysters in New Jersey. Martin v. Waddell was a continuation of the dispute over common and
private rights raised 21 years earlier in Arnold v. Mundy.94 The Court's
91. Id. at 92-93. See also the opening of Rossell's opinion (supra text accompanying
note 81).
92. Id. at 75. The state could regulate use, "but still this power.., is nothing more
than what is called the jus regium, the right of regulating, improving, and securing for
the common benefit of every individual citizen." Id. at 78.
93. Id. at 70-77. Popular criticisms of this foundation are addressed infra note 100.

94. Merritt Martin's attorney declared that the object of the suit originally brought
by Waddell was to review and overturn the decision issued in Arnold v. Mundy. See
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 389 (1842).
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opinion relied heavily upon, and confirmed, Kirkpatrick's ruling. 95 As
Martinv Waddell replicates the four essential elements of Arnold v Mundy,
only the Court's position
on the issue of construction warrants addi96
tional emphasis here.
The Court explicitly set a question that required a judgment on
construction, 97 saw great issues tied to this judgment,98 and argued for
an expansive contextual approach:
And in deciding a question like this, we must not look merely
to the strict technical meaning of the words of the letters patent.
The laws and institutions of England, the history of the times,
the object of the charter, the contemporaneous construction
given to it, and the usages under it, for the century and more
which has since elapsed, are all entitled to consideration and
weight. 99
Notably, the Court did not apply this contextual approach to
the times of the oyster dispute at hand. Following the state court, the
interpretive effort focused on the times of the colonial charters and on
the times of Magna Charta. A wider application of this approach is critical to understanding both the public trust doctrine and the centrality
of the doctrine to the Alaska debate over ITQs. 1°°

95. The extent of the Court's reliance on Kirkpatrick's ruling was acknowledged in
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894).
96. The symmetry between the two cases is strong regarding: (1) emphasis on common
use rights and distributional equity (see Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. at 406-18; see also the
specific arguments presented by the plaintiff's attorney (id. at 380-92)); and (2) the
importance of the issues involved (particularly the tie between common use rights and
the conception of nationhood); see id. at 411-13. The distinction between use rights and
regulation is less clearly drawn than in Arnold v. Mundy but the Court noted that
regulation for preservation occurred as early as 1719; see id. at 417.
97. The question was whether the submerged lands and associated uses "were
intended to be a trust for the common use of the new community about to be established;
or private property to be parcelled out and sold to individuals." See Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. at 411.
98. The possibility that a chain of conveyances were all impressed with public trust
responsibilities removed the case from the category of conventional private title
conveyances; id. In particular, the grant from the King to the Duke of York was "an
instrument upon which was to be founded the institutions of a great political community;
and in that light it should be regarded and construed"; id. at 412.
99. Id. at 411.
100. This emphasis on contextualization contains a refutation of the charges that the
public trust doctrine was the unsupportable creation of the Arnold and Martin courts;
see Deveney, supra note 74, at 55-58, and MacGrady, supra note 74, at 589-591. To assert
that the public trust doctrine was pulled from ether simply because the Romans had no
concept of "trusts" is to be precisely the kind of narrow pedant-relying only on the
"strict technical meaning of the words"-that the Martin court cautioned against. It was
the thread of the idea of preserving common rights, not the specific invocation of the
word trust, that the Arnold and Martin courts found so important.
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c) Contextualizing the Public Trust: From the King's Deer to Wage
Labor.
Professor Joseph Sax has argued that only the superficial aspects of the public trust doctrine are revealed independent of a contextual appreciation of the doctrine's formative ideas. 101 This is entirely
consistent with the courts' construction of the doctrine. But both courts
and commentators have studied a specific place and period-England
from Magna Charta to the colonial grants. It is suggested here that application of this contextual approach to the public trust doctrine also
include the historical period of the New Jersey oyster cases-whose
laws, institutions, and history are all entitled to consideration and
weight. The core meaning of the public trust doctrine is found in the
class relations of old world game laws.10 2 It is also found in a 19th century struggle between populist and progressive visions for the American political economy. This struggle featured populist concern for the
rights of labor versus the rights of capital, and an associated populist
opposition to the use of private property to disadvantage labor vis-Avis capital, rather than opposition to private property per se. Adding
this populist-progressive struggle to the contextual analysis of the public trust doctrine is a critical step in the construction of an archetype
public trust issue.
A contextual analysis emphasizes that the focus on ideology is
not primarily directed towards the role of the courts and individual
justices per se, but to broader currents in public thought (i.e., the doctrine cannot be explained by the ideological commitment of select individuals, be they the King of England or American justices). The early
public trust cases are part of a larger chain of 19th century fisheries access disputes, between those embracing a vision of national progress
rooted in local small scale producerism, and those linking national
progress with large scale interregional industrialism. 10 3 Fisheries use
rights conflicts pitted a "culture of the commoners" 10 4 against those
who viewed them as obstacles to progress. 10 5 Notably, the common101. See Sax, supra note 75.
102. See Sax, supra note 75, at 188-91; see also B. McCay, Sea Tenure and the Culture of
the Commoners, in Small Boats, supra note 73, at 203, 206-10. This distributional equity
core is augmented by two interrelated emphases on promoting evolutionary not
revolutionary change (see Sax, supra note 75, at 188) and on safeguarding democratic
processes (see Sax, supra note 74, at 560-61).
103. See, e.g., McCay, supra note 102, at 211-219 and A. McEvoy, The Fisherman's
Problem 65-78, 88-100 (1986). G. Kulik, Dams, Fish, and Farmers: Defense of Public Rights
in Eighteenth-Century Rhode Island, in The Countryside in the Age of Capitalist
Transformation 25 (S. Hahn and J. Prude eds., 1985) presents an entirely different type
of dispute involving fish, from an earlier time period, that, nonetheless, conforms to this
characterization.
104. McCay, supra note 102, at 205.
105. McEvoy, supra note 103, at 65-78, 88-100.

Fall 1993]

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE?: U.S. COMMERCIAL FISHERIES

941

ers' argument was not based on absolute opposition to private property qua use rights. Instead, it emphasized the determining role propplayed in a class struggle between capital and producerist
erty rights
106
labor:
Are the fishermen to be driven from their fishing grounds,
are the people to be deprived of food, that a few men may
be made rich out of the public treasury of the sea? And has
the exhe or they only the right to catch fish who can10afford
7
tensive and costly apparatus of the trappers?
These descriptions of 19th century fisheries disputes suggest a
general struggle between populism and progressivism: producerism,
use rights in support of labor, and a vision of national progress built
on local stability versus industrial capitalism, use rights in support of
capital, and a vision of national progress defined simply as national
economic growth. 10 8 Consideration of populism in particular assists in
construction of the archetype public trust issue.
While American populism was generally concerned with
labor/capital relations as a determining factor of class relations, specific concern over the transition to wage labor was the sine qua non of
populism. 1°9 Sentiments in favor of structuring property rights to benefit labor, not capital, were not based on a denunciation of private property. Rather, they were based on a "radical Lockeanism" that sought to
use private property to effect distributional equity.n 0 Finally, concern
for labor/capital relations was not confined to a narrow populist fringe
but was prevalent throughout the American political landscape: "Labor
is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor,
and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the
superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration."II
106. McCay, supra note 102, at 224, notes that the commoners embraced a notion that
use rights should go first to those who needed them most. This notion is consistent with
existing contextualizations of the public trust doctrine; see Sax, supra note 75, at 191.
107. S. Baird, Report on the Condition of the Sea Fisheries on the South Coast of New
England in 1871 and 1872, in Report of the US Commission of Fish and Fisheries for 1871,
at 3, 101 (1873) (cited in McCay, supra note 102, at 215).
108. See C. Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics 40-225 (1991).
Note that I use the terms populism and progressivism broadly. I refer to broad ideological
undercurrents, consistent with those chronicled by Lasch, supra, that were growing in
the 19th century, not to specific movements and moments resulting from these undercurrents
(e.g., the late 19th century formation of "Progressive" and "Populist" political parties).
Thus by progressivism I am not making an explicit reference to the conservation movement
associated with Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot but that "Progressive" movement's
commitment to scientific expertise, rational central planning, and efficiency is representative
of the progressive ideology I refer to; see S. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of
Efficiency (Atheneum 1969). This ideology grew, like the science and industrialism it
embraced, as the 19th century progressed but its roots lie in the epistemological revolution
of the Enlightenment; see S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis (1990).
109. Lasch, supra note 108, at 203-05, 223.
110. See R. Ellis, Radical Lockeanism in American Political Culture 45 W. Pol. Q. 825,
831-42 (1992).
111. A. Lincoln, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861) in Abraham Lincoln
633 (R. Basler ed., 1946).
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The application of the contextual method articulated in Martin v. Waddell thus provides the following archetype of a public trust
issue. At the broadest level, a public trust issue involves a concern for
class relations, mediated by property rights relative to trust resources.
More specifically, the issue revolves around distributional equity concerns spawned by proposed alienation of trust resources. The archetypal issue is also characterized by 1) a populist/progressive split over
notions of progress and nationhood; 2) a populist focus on distributional equity concerns related to use rights; 3) within these general concerns, the populist position focuses on labor/capital relations with
perhaps even a refined focus on the development of wage labor; and
4) the populist position does not evince blanket opposition to alienation of trust resources, but to specific forms of alienation relative to
the distributional equity and labor/capital concerns.
Measuring the Alaska Debate
The Alaska debate is an incarnation of this idealized public trust
issue. First the debate centers on the proposed alienation of the halibut and sablefish fisheries. 112 Second, the Alaska-based opposition to
the plan is part of a long-standing concern over the rural community
impacts of limited entry and of the view that national benefits flow
from communities to the state and then to the nation. 113 Third, the opposition is squarely centered on distributional equity issues, principally associated with the windfall give-away to vessel owners. 114 Fourth,
this initial allocation to vessel owners was seen as a deliberate disenfranchisement of labor.115 Finally, segments of the opposition endorsed
the concept of privatized harvesting rights but consistently argued for
a more equitable approach especially in regard to the windfall profit
112. Note too, that the magnitude of the proposed alienation satisfies the scale effect
criterion articulated in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,453 (1892)), that
is, we are talking about the alienation of common use rights to the entire halibut fishery
not some limited expanse. Dispute over the exact nature of the alienation involved in
ITQ systems is discussed infra part 3.
113. On the emphasis on community well being, see, e.g., Issues & Options, supra
note 16, at 145-46, comments and questions of former Kodiak Mayor and long time
commercial fisher D. Hernnsteen. On the issue of nationhood and national benefits,
proponents of limited entry have long recognized that the Alaskans were arguing "for
working from the welfare of Alaska toward the national welfare." J. Crutchfield & G.
Pontecorvo, The Pacific Salmon Fisheries: A Study of Irrational Conservation 50 (1969).
It is no exaggeration to say that property rights in fisheries are essential to the very
concept of Alaska as a state. I refer to the role of the debate over fish traps in shaping
the battle for statehood; see, e.g., R. Cooley, Politics and Conservation: The Decline of
the Alaska Salmon 31-97 (1963), and Morehouse & Hession, supra note 21, at 296-97.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. Extension of this general concern to
a specific focus on wage labor is discussed infra, see text accompanying notes 142-47.
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and labor/capital issues. 116 The Alaska debate over ITQs measures up
at any level as a public trust issue.
Part 3: Implications of Seeing ITQs as a Public Trust Issue
From the core elements of the original articulation of the public trust doctrine to the broader characterization offered above, the symmetry between the debate and the doctrine is clear. This clarity, however,
poses a paradox. Why, if the connection between the debate over ITQs
and the public trust doctrine is both so strong and so evident, has the
debate not been considered from the public trust perspective?
There are four readily identifiable explanations for the failure
to associate the Alaska debate (and limited entry debates generally)
with the public trust doctrine: 1) the obscurity of the doctrine; 2) a rejection of the claim that ITQs involve private property concepts repugnant
to the doctrine (where the focus is on property); 3) a similar rejection
of the private property claim (this time focused on the "privateness"
of ITQs); and 4) a revised obscurity explanation based on the modern
contours of the public trust doctrine. These possible explanations provide a survey of the insights offered by the public trust perspective.
These explanations and insights are the focus of this section.
a) The Publicly Obscure Doctrine
One possible explanation of the lack of recognition of the public trust context of the debate over ITQs is that the doctrine is simply
too obscure. The doctrine is generally not well known, a fate compounded by the dominance of the international face of fisheries management since Grotius. Were it empirically sound, this explanation
would present an unflattering intellectual implication regarding our
collective scholarship and curiosity. But this potential explanation defies the empirical record. Knowledge of the doctrine is perhaps less
widespread within fisheries management circles compared to other environmental arenas, but the doctrine is known. Significantly, it is known
by those familiar with limited entry. 117 More significant still, the exis116. See, e.g., L. Cooper, supra note 61.
117. See, e.g., G. Cook, The Public Trust Doctrine in Alaska, in Recent Developments in
Wildlife and Fisheries Law in Alaska 29 (Alaska Bar Ass'n, Anchorage, AK, 1992) (the
author specializes in wildlife and fisheries law in Alaska where limited entry is certainly
well known); J.Archer & C. Jarman, Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities:Applying Public
Trust Principlesto the Management of EEZ Space and Resources, 17 Ocean & Coastal Mgmt.
253 (1992) (the authors are members of the Ocean Governance Study Group, a group
that knows of the public trust doctrine and has an ad hoc working group focused on the
"privatization of fishery resources"); see Center for the Study of Marine Policy, Graduate
College of Marine Studies, U. Del., Pub. DEL-SG-17-92, Ocean Governance: A New Vision
(B. Cicin-Sain ed., 1992); H. Knight & J. Lambert, L.S.U. Sea Grant Rpt. No. LSU-T-75004, Legal Aspects of Limited Entry for Commercial Marine Fisheries 1, 114 (1975); and
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tence of such a doctrine was known (however sketchily) by the Council. 118 The problem is not a lack of familiarity with the doctrine but a
failure to grasp the conceptual connection between two known entities. 119 This conceptual disconnect could be explained by an "it's not
really privatization" response; a contention that the ITQ plan is not repugnant to the public trust doctrine's constraint on alienation of trust
resources. There are two components to this response which arise from
the two concepts embedded in "private property." The two components are treated as separate explanations below.
b) It's Not Really Privatization, Part 1: The Fish are still Fugitive
Regarding property, the public trust/ITQ nexus could be refuted by an assertion that ITQs represent no creation of property rights.
Fish are, with or without ITQ management, wild (ferae naturae), remaining
H. Knight & T. Jackson, L.S.U. Sea Grant Rpt. No. LSU-T-73-003, Legal Impediments to
the use of Interstate Agreements in Coordinated Fisheries Management Programs 1, 3234 (1973).
118. The introductory section of the DEIS, supra note 30, at 1-11, notes that the legality
of ITQs has been challenged on the basis of the public trust doctrine. The DEIS, at 1-11,
1-12, then dismisses this notion with a curious characterization and subordination of the
public trust doctrine:
Simply stated, [the] public trust doctrine says that while the sovereign may
dispose of its proprietary rights in trust lands, it cannot alienate its obligation to manage trust lands in the public interest. Whether or not the public trust doctrine applies to marine resources, the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act authorizes the Secretary of Commerce
to establish limited access systems (citation omitted).
This quotation represents the entire recorded discussion afforded the public trust
doctrine. Current Council staff are uncertain as to the original impetus behind this scant
mention of the doctrine. Personal Communication with C. Oliver, Deputy Executive Director,
North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (June 21, 1993). Perhaps the Council's
uncertainty over the maritime scope of the public trust doctrine is partially understandable.
Under the Magnuson Act, the Council develops management policies for fisheries in the
federal zone which extends from the seaward boundary of Alaska to 200 nautical miles
offshore; 16 U.S.C. § 1802(6) (1988), 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (1988), Proclamation No. 5030, 3
C.F.R. 22 (1984). In contrast, the seaward boundary of Alaska (3 nautical miles from the
coastal baseline, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b), 1312 (1988)) represents the conventional limit of
the public trust doctrine; see generally Putting the Public Trust Doctrine to Work 1, 27
n.72 (D. Slade ed., 1990). Council actions might thus not normally involve public trust
issues. However, the Council's privatization plans were anything but normal in this respect
since, for the halibut fishery, the plans were explicitly intended to apply within both
state and federal waters. See Proposed Rule, supra note 10, at 57,131, 57,144. Since the
public trust doctrine clearly applies to fisheries issues in Alaska state waters (see, e.g.,
CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1117-19 (1988)), there can be no question as to
the general relevance of the doctrine to the present discussion. Note that it would be
odd if the public trust doctrine principles that apply to the halibut fishery 2.9 miles from
the coastal baseline do not apply to the same fishery 3.1 miles from the coastal baseline,
but such important federalism issues (manifest in the case study under consideration)
are beyond the scope of this article.
119. Ironically, the one commentator that does link the limited entry debates to the
public trust doctrine views the doctrine, and relevant aspects of Magna Charta, as an
unfortunate historical anomaly responsible for interrupting the allegedly normal evolution
of common law towards private property; see Scott, supra note 6, at 73-80, 89. See also
Scott, supra note 73, at 17-18.
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unowned until reduced to possession in accordance with the law of
capture. 120 This potential explanation is irrelevant to the public trust
doctrine because it rests on a fundamental confusion of the corporeal
with the incorporeal aspects of property and of res nullius (what is not
owned) with res communes (what is owned in common). Since at least
the time of Justinian, property has been regarded as a right, not a thing,
thus permitting the corporeal/incorporeal distinction to be drawn:
1. Corporeal things are those which are by their nature tangible, as land .... 121
2. Incorporeal things are those which are not tangible. They
are such as consist in a right, as an inheritance, a usufruct,
a use ....

122

The fisheries basis of the public trust doctrine was not concerned
with any common right to fish themselves, they remained res nullius.
The focal point was instead an activity judged res communes, the common "right of fishing." 123 Thus, this rejection of a public trust connection is based on a misspecification error. This leads to the second
component of the "it's not privatization" response.
c) It's Not Privatization, Part 2: It's not a right, it's a privilege ...
well whatever it is, it's not private
This response correctly shifts the focus on rights from the fish
to the activity of fishing. The question becomes, do ITQs privatize the
right to fish thus raising an obvious challenge to public trust principles? A negative answer exists in three varieties, all driven by the
specter of the constitutional "takings" issue. 124 The first comes from
existing analyses of the legal contours of limited entry and can be accurately applied to the specific case of ITQs: "A claim that there is a
property right in the right to fish is groundless as an abstract proposition." 125 Such pronouncements are the product of analyses conspicu120. This is exactly the approach employed by commentators who dismiss the notion
of legal impediments to limited entry. See, e.g., C. Koch, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of
Limited Entry, in Limited Entry, supra note 4, at 251, 265-66. Note that Koch's argument
on this point is based on the issue of a potential constitutional "takings" case. Koch does
not mention the public trust doctrine at any point in his analysis. See also Note, Legal
Dimensions of Entry Fishery Management, 17 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 757, 766-67 (1976),
wherein the author anticipates Koch's analysis and notes the public trust doctrine without
establishing a connection between the doctrine and debate over limited entry. Id. at 760.
121. J.Inst. 2.2.1. pr.
122. J.Inst. 2.2.2 pr. For a contemporary restatement on the distinction between
corporeal and incorporeal, see C. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in Property:
Mainstream and Critical Positions 1, 3-9 (C. Macpherson ed., 1978).
123. J.Inst. 2.1.2 pr. (emphasis added); see also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 74 (1821)
(quoting Lord Hale on "the right of fishing").
124. See Koch, supra note 120, at 265-66 for an introduction to limited entry takings
issues (relative to U.S. Const. amend. V).
125. Koch, supra note 120, at 265.
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ously lacking consideration of the public trust doctrine, representing
a return to the obscurity explanation.
The second form of answer that negates the takings implication, and implicitly rejects a public trust/ITQ nexus, asserts that ITQs
represent mere harvesting privileges, not rights. This tack is employed
by those responsible for defending the ITQ plan and features an emphasis on the revocability of the ITQ system. 126 The third variation on
a theme denying takings and public trust implications abandons the
privileges versus rights distinction and simply states that there is no
privatization involved; ITQs are just another form of management of
a public resource) 27 The merit and the implications of these privatization denials can be evaluated by consideration of first principles.
First, the public trust doctrine responded to an attempted assertion of an exclusive right of fishing. Whether property or privilege,
ITQs are decidedly private in the sense of excludability and are thus
precisely the subject matter of the doctrine. Second, we can look to the
first principles of ITQs to address the rights-versus-privileges issue
head on. For first principles, look to theory. The theory behind ITQ
management is clear. The critique of open access is based on an appeal
to propertynot "privileges." "From the start, it was recognized that fishery problems were related to the absence of individual property rights
in the fish stocks" and all forms of limited entry sought a property
right in the fishery as a partial proxy for the elusive goal of property
128
rights to the fish themselves.
It is also clear that theoreticians speaking of property rights
and "rights based fishing" mean private property rights:
[A]n ITQ ...[is] a private property right, an instrument for
129
extending the institution of property from land to the sea.
....ITQs are part of one of the great institutional changes
of our times: the enclosure and privatization of the common
130
resources of the ocean.
This emphasis on private property is understandable, deliberate, and in fact necessary. ITQs are but a specific case of a more generic
free market approach to environmental regulation. This approach ap126. "Quota shares are a harvest privilege that may be modified or revoked at any
time without compensation." Transmittal memo from D. Cottingham, Director, Office of

Ecology and Conservation, NOAA, accompanying the FEIS,supra note 30 (Dec. 1, 1992).
Note that the courts have accepted this tactic in a case involving the first federal ITQ
plan which addressed mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries; see Sea Watch

Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370, 375-76 (D.D.C. 1991).
127. 1 am indebted to Allison Rieser of the University of Maine's Marine Law Institute
for bringing a concise version of this potential explanation to my attention.

128. See Copes, supra note 13, at 278.
129. See Rights Based Fishing, supra note 16, at 1. The entire volume is replete with
references to the private property nature of ITQs.

130. Id. at 3.
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peals to the marketplace to induce good resource husbandry, thus remedying the tragedy of the commons. 131 In the realm of fisheries management, the free market approach has acquired the moniker "rights
based fishing." 132 The perspective provided by the public trust doctrine reveals a suite of implications for the growing appeal to rightsbased fishing
The public trust doctrine was born of careful consideration of
the distinctions between private and common property. Similar attentiveness lays bare the hypocrisy inherent in attempts to transform the
nature of ITQs from private property to privileges. 133 Ironically, this
attempt to dodge the takings issue jeopardizes the effectiveness of ITQs
by undermining the certainty of expectations provided by private property. The whole theory of ITQ management rests on certainty of expectations. In other contexts proponents have decried the destabilizing
134
effects of the rights-into-privileges transformation.
The ideals of the public trust reveal a contrasting irony in the
takings dodge, the potential futility of the whole maneuver. Expectations associated with property are as much a state of mind and practice as they are a product of law. 135 Try as they might to avoid it, the
proponents of ITQs are about to confront the bedevilment of entitlements that has long plagued managers of western rangelands. 136
131. Cf. P.Peters, Embedded Systems and Rooted Models: The Grazing Lands of Botswana
and the Commons Debate, in The Question of the Commons 171,176 (B.McCay & J.Acheson
eds., 1987).
132. See Rights Based Fishing, supra note 16.
133. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
134. This danger has been noted by one of the foremost proponents of the theoretical
basis of ITQs; see Scott, supra note 6, at 86-87. Scott argues that revocable privileges/rights
will not provide adequate security of expectations that in turn unleash a long term
husbandry effect. According to Scott, full actuation of this effect will require private
property in the fish themselves. Of course, it is possible to make one more about face
and argue that no one will really take the revocability clause seriously, thus effecting
the privatization remedy to the tragedy of the commons. As the Council noted, "Itlhere
are no known instances of an IFQ system being permanently abandoned in favor of open
access or license[] [limitation]." SEIS, supra note 30, at 153.
135. Cf. Sax, supra note 75, at 191-93.
136. The early embrace of ITQs by national environmental groups is particularly
puzzling when viewed from this perspective (note a later reversal in position occurred;
see supra note 52). Regarding rangelands, see, e.g., R. Cowart & S. Fairfax, Public Lands
Federalism: Judicial Theory and Administrative Reality, 15 Ecology L. Q. 375, 390 & n.65
(1988). Decades of court debate on the rights versus privileges issue in rangelands has
settled on privileges (see United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973)), but an earlier court
foresaw the practical reality behind this shellgame with a clarity that fisheries afficianados
are advised to ponder:
We recognize that the rights under the Taylor Grazing Act do not fall within
the conventional category of vested rights in property. Yet whether they be
called rights, privileges, or bare licenses, or by whatever name, while they
exist they are something of real value to the possessors ....
The jurisdiction
of equity is flexible and should not be confined to rigid categories so that
the granting of an injunction will depend upon nomenclature rather than
upon substance. Red Canyon Sheep Company v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308,315 (D.C.
Cir.1938).
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The public trust perspective also reveals gross conceptual reductionism regarding property rights. First, there is the reduction of
the property rights aspect of ITQs to a takings question. Only when
the takings issue rears its head is any attention paid to the nature of
the interest created by ITQs. But distributional equity, not takings and
compensation, was the essence of the early public trust and is the core
of the opposition in the Alaska debate. This fundamental difference in
the perception of property rights is heightened in the second exhibit
of reductionism. In both the general and specific debates over ITQ management, proponents reduce rights to private property rights. There is
no better evidence of collapse in conceptual capacity, nor of the spread
of this loss, than the ubiquitous phrase "rights-based fishing." The phrase
suggests that non-rights based fishing exists. 137 Surely, the public trust
doctrine exudes a response self-evident to Benajah Mundy and Merritt Martin: all fishing is rights-based.
This reduction of rights additionally provides for a particular
telling of environmental history. To proponents of limited entry and
ITQs, common use rights exist due to an historical anomaly: Magna
Charta unfortunately truncated the natural evolution towards private
property rights and "by default" common use rights were "allowed to
reappear." 138 This tepid view is in direct contrast to the sanguinary
view embodied in the public trust doctrine. Rights are not simply "allowed" to appear, they are actively made and defended. 139 Benejah
Mundy and his belligerent band of commoners vigorously asserted common use rights in a case that viewed complementary provisions of Magna
140
Charta as triumphant assertions, not tragic historical accidents.
137. Other forms of rights are acknowledged (see, e.g., K. Ruddle, The Organization
of TraditionalInshore Fishery Management Systems in the Pacific, in Rights Based Fishing,
supra note 16, at 73) but the overwhelming emphasis is on private property rights. The
degree to which the implicit conceptual hegemony of the phrase has been uncritically
accepted is evidenced by its casual use by commentators who otherwise devote critical
analytical attention to ITQ systems; see, e.g., Creed, supra note 5, at 1-25.
138. Scott, supra note 73, at 18.
139. This is a central thesis presented by McCay, supra note 76. In contrast, the
conceptual glaucoma of the rights based fishing school is so advanced that it permits
incredulous denials of history: "[Tihe common law offers us no base case for a modern
maritime fishing right. We have no history of conflict and incremental change to look
back to." Scott, supra note 73, at 18.
140. The triumphal view is expressed in Note, supra note 74, at 789. How is it that
the same set of historical facts, regarding the genesis of the doctrine, can produce such
divergent accounts? The situation seems ripe for an investigation of William Cronon's
assertion that our perception of environmental history is as much a product of the
imperatives of narrative form as it is of the empirical observations behind the narrative
accounts, W. Cronon, A Placefor Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative, 78 J. Am. Hist.
1347 (1992). The tragic view of Magna Charta should present a sobering reality check
for those that attempt to deny the privatization inherent in ITQs. Writing of necessary
steps towards ITQs and ultimately full ownership, Scott, supra note 6, at 89, states: "The
biggest step of course is to reverse the direction once taken in Magna Carta. That fisheries
in tidal and navigable waters should not be subject to private ovnership and planning
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The public trust doctrine provides a useful perspective on the
privatization question not only in terms of the creation of private rights,
but in terms of the distribution of these rights. The initial allocation of
ITQs only to vessel owners stands in direct contrast to the historical
emphasis on using property rights to effect distributional equity, particularly via the structuring of labor/capital relations. The justification
for this allocation is even more repugnant to the doctrine and evinces
more conceptual confusion. In rewarding investors for their risk while
denying crew labor, the Council reversed the emphasis on the rights of
labor embodied in the public trust doctrine. This produced a specific
definition of "fishermen" as vessel owners and independent crew as
"investments": "An IFQ system... [would] allow fishermen to remove
vessels, gear, crewmen and other investments from the fishery in order
141
to increase the profit from each IFQ."
The Council went beyond redefining fishermen as vessel owners and relegated crew to the status of wage labor. Opponents of the
ITQ plan noted that by law and by practice, crew are independent pro142
ducers that sell their share of the catch not their labor.
The distinction between wage laborer and independent producer
is not trivial and provides a basis for treatment of one of the key aspects of the Alaska debate. 143 The transformation of labor from holder
of property rights in the productive process to a mere commodity in
that process represents the primal fear of 19th century populism. 144 The
Council's rationale implies that this transformation has already occurred; experience with ITQ management elsewhere suggests that it
might occur.145 In either case, the relative position of labor is weakened
is an idea so completely antithetical to the very concept of quotas as to lie beyond
discussion in this paper."
141. SEIS, supra note 30, at 149. This exclusionary definition of fishermen seems
problematic from the perspective of National Standard No. 4 of the Magnuson Act which
requires that allocations of fishing privileges among U.S. fishermen shall be "fair and
equitable to all such fishermen" 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(4) (1988). The focus on the rights of
capital in the harvesting sector also ignores the co-dependent processing sector. These
issues have been clearly articulated to the Council as it proceeds to develop an ITQ plan
for the billion dollar groundfish fisheries off Alaska; see Letter from J. Plesha, General
Counsel, Trident Seafoods, to R. Alverson, Chairman, Comprehensive Rationalization
Committee, North Pacific Fishery Management Council (June 14,1993) (on file with author).
"Comprehensive rationalization" is the Council's euphemism for privatization.
142. See supra text accompanying note 62.
143. Note too that proponents of ITQs are well aware of the distinction as evidenced
by the attention paid to the distinction in the so called inshore/offshore allocation dispute
over groundfish; see, e.g., North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Potential Elements
of Individual Fishing Quotas or License Limitation Programs in North Pacific Groundfish
and Crab Fisheries 9 (June 15, 1993).
144. See Lasch, supra note 108, at 203-08, 212-16, 223.
145. Wage labor arrangements for crew are beginning to appear in the British Columbia
halibut fishery as a result of implementation of an ITQ management system for that
fishery. Telephone Interview with B. Turris, Dep't Fisheries & Oceans, Vancouver, Can.
(Apr. 20, 1993).
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and the symmetry between the ITQ opponents' and 19th century populists' concern for what Lincoln called "the door of advancement" is
striking. The subject of concern is more formally known as an "occupational ladder" in which wage labor occupies the lowest rung. If the
introduction of ITQs results in either a transition to wage labor or a
reduction in traditional share benefits, 146 then the effect of ITQs will
be to lower labor's position on the ladder and/or to space the rungs
farther apart. Passage up a modified ladder will be most difficult for
the more marginal participants in the
fisheries, especially Native
147
Alaskans and recent women entrants.
Finally, consider the weak version of the "it's not privatization" response which states that ITQs are just another form of management. Here too, a public trust perspective provides analytical
purchase and yet more evidence of loss of conceptual capacity. The distinction between use rights and regulation was a central principle upon
which the doctrine was founded. ITQs, as privatized harvesting rights,
do not represent just another form of management; they are qualitatively different from other forms of management. Of course, the relevant subject of management may not be fisheries resources per se, but
industrial relations in contemporary society. As proponents of ITQs
have noted, the privatization of common use rights is "one of the great
institutional changes of our times." 148 This transformation is the basis
of the larger struggle between populist and progressive visions of
progress:
My exact point is that we are not trying anything new on
the fishery. What we are trying to say is 'let's let the fishery
be like every other industry in our capitalist economy.' We're
149
going to create property rights. That's all, that's it.
146. By one estimate, crew in the mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery earn $20,000 less on
an annual basis since the introduction of ITQ management. See K. Beal, National Marine
Fisheries Serv., Surf Clam/Ocean Quahog ITQ Evaluation Based on Interviews with
Captains, Owners and Crews (undated) (report contained in materials released to J.
O'Malley, Executive Director, East Coast Fisheries Foundation, Inc., in response to a Freedom
of Information Act request) (copy on file with author).
147. The wage labor issue was recognized, though effectively dismissed, by the
Council in the early stages of the planning process; see SEIS, supra note 30, at 157-59,
176. As the debate moved towards the extremes characterized in Part 1, this issue (like
the public trust doctrine) disappeared. Significantly, opponents who questioned the
impact of the ITQ system on the traditional path of occupationaladvancement did not
draw a connection between their concerns and earlier mention of a possible transition
to wage labor; see supra text accompanying notes 62-64. On the ladder concept generally,
see J. Atack, The Agricultural Ladder Revisited: A New Look at an Old Question with Some
Data for 1860, 63 Agricultural History 1 (1989).
148. Rights Based Fishing, supra note 16, at 3; cf. supra note 130.
149. Statement by L. Anderson, Open Discussion, in Frady, Issues & Options, supra
note 16, at 356. Dr. Anderson is a prominent contributor to the economic theory of
fisheries management; see, e.g., L. Anderson, The Economics of Fisheries Management

(1977).
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All of the possible denials of an ITQ/public trust doctrine nexus
considered thus far are flawed. Rather than attempting to fashion another denial focused on interpretations of ITQs, perhaps a focus on interpretation of the public trust doctrine instead would be more successful.
d) It's not the (modem) Public Trust: Or, In Which Trust Shall We
Trust?
The most plausible explanation for the lack of a recognized
linkage between the public trust doctrine and the ITQ debate is that
the linkage depicted herein is illusory, based on an outdated characterization of the public trust doctrine. Current characterizations of the
doctrine are dominated by emphasis on environmental preservation.
Two ironies are associated with this emphasis. First, it is not clear that
the ITQ plan is consistent with the preservation emphasis. Second, it
is clear that the popular pursuit of preservation threatens to undermine
the public trust doctrine's effectiveness as a legal doctrine.
Contemporary commentators on the public trust doctrine distinguish between a "classic" and a "modern" form of the public trust
doctrine.15 0 The signal feature of the modern public trust doctrine is
the emphasis on the "fiduciary" duty of government to preserve trust
resources (the "corpus" of the trust):
[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power
to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common
heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands... 151
While the courts emphasized preservation as early as Illinois
Central, the objective of this duty has shifted from preservationfor use
to preservation itself: "There is a growing public recognition that one
of the most important public uses... [of trust resources is] preservation ... "152
The contemporary emphasis on preservation has all but eclipsed
the original emphasis on equity. The eclipse is near total as evidenced
by the conceptual chasm separating the doctrine articulated in Arnold
v Mundy from the doctrine depicted in current characterizations:
The notion that governments hold certain resources in trust
for the public and have an affirmative obligation to protect
15 3
them is called the public trust doctrine.
150. On classic, see C. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14
U.C.Davis L. Rev. 269, 273-74 (1980); on modern, see Archer & Jarman, supra note 117,
at 256, 261.
151. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724
(Cal. 1983). For general emphasis of the fiduciary duty, see Sax, supra note 75, at 185. In
the context of Alaska specifically, see Cook, supra note 117, at 1, 18.
152. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). Cf. Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
153. M. Mantell, Frontier Issues, in Managing National Park System Resources: A
Handbook on Legal Duties, Opportunities, and Tools 235, 244 (M. Mantell ed., 1990).
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At its simplest level, the public trust doctrine revolves
around the concept that government owes its citizens special duties of care, or stewardship, regarding certain natural
resources which the state holds in trust for the public. At
this most basic level, the public trust doctrine holds that government must act as a fiduciary in its management of the resources which constitute the corpus of the trust. 154
Thus, the lack of attention to the public trust dimensions of the
ITQ debate can be explained by a shift in the characteristic emphasis
of the doctrine itself. But acknowledging this shift does not dismiss
the inquiry; the shift itself warrants consideration from several perspectives.
Consider the magnitude of the shift. The central concerns of
the "classic" doctrine-distributional equity, evolutionary rather than
revolutionary change, and safeguarding democratic processes 5 5-all
point to potential incompatibilities in the Alaska debate, but implicit
in the lack of attention to the public trust perspective is the opposite
conclusion: that the ITQ plan is unquestioningly compatible with the
doctrine. This conclusion reflects the modern emphasis on preservation. There is an obvious explanation for this emphasis, based on the
presumed innocence of the past: the concessions of the "classic" public trust doctrine to common use rights and distributional equity are
an artifact of an age that did not account for the possibility of resource
depletion. This nostalgic presumption is supported by the long play
accorded Grotius' notions of inexhaustibility, but it is confounded by
the factual record concerning common rights in coastal waters.15 6 The
Arnold v Mundy court explicitly recognized the issue of depletion and
pointed to a long regulatory history focused on preservation. 15 7 Still,
the court chose to draw a distinction between use rights and regulation, a distinction complementary to an emphasis on distributional equity and class relations as mediated by common use rights.
The shift in the doctrine's emphasis is more a reflection of our
own cognitive processes than those of our ancestors. Consideration of
the emphasis on preservation illuminates an unexpected alignment of
interests on both ends of the ITQ/public trust doctrine connection. Consider first the compatibility between the ITQ plan and the preserva154. Cook, supra note 117, at 1.That the eclipse is not yet total is evident from statements
such as "reasonable regulation (of trust resources] is in order; use prohibition is not."
People v. El Dorado County, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815, 817 (1980).
155. See supra note 102.
156. See Lasch, supra note 108, at 82-119, on the connection between progressivism
and the embrace of nostalgia.
157. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick noted that no matter what the ruling, the resource
might be destroyed, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 9 (1821), while Justice Rossell noted
regulation for preservation as early as 1718; see id. at 92.
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tion emphasis of the modern public trust doctrine. The departure from
a strict focus on preservation is obvious in a plan motivated by the desire to curb the tragedy of rent dissipation, to secure the conventional
make commercial fishing like any other
world-view of biologists, and to158
industry in capitalist America.
This last motivation is particularly significant. The apparent outcome of the Alaska debate suggests a tacit alignment of environmental preservationists and free market economics. The unasked question
is what are the implications, in terms of preservation goals, of a "successful" transformation of commercial fishing? Is the spirit of the "modern" public trust being met in other areas with privatized harvesting
rights to public natural resources? Furthermore, if we think about
preservation and privatization, is the exclusion of distributional equity
desirable? The implicit judgment that preservation and common use
rights are mutually exclusive goes against the grain of much current
thought
on the links between human and environmental sustainability.159
Shifting to the public trust doctrine, the more the public trust
doctrine drifts away from its original attention to distributional equity
and class relations, the more it approaches one of two unexpected outcomes. First, many contemporary applications of the public trust doctrine exhibit a conflation of the doctrine with the nonspecific appeal to
the "public interest" found in the multiple use mandates of federal statutes
guiding most utilization of public natural resources. 160 Conflation with
broad public interest statutes condemns the public trust doctrine to an
amorphous future. 16 1 The second possible trajectory of the public trust
doctrine is one of effective absorption by other forms of trusts. Em158. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 59 and 149, respectively. While it is
certainly foolish to attempt to draw too strong a line between the non-biological goals
of the plan and beneficial biological outcomes, naive appeal to structural change is
equally foolish. An a priori case for the biological benefits of ITQ management can be
made, but the same case can be made for any structural form of disciplined resource
management. In and of themselves, structural changes do not effect a political will to
manage. On the issue of blind appeals to structuralism versus a commitment to management,
see M. Marchak, What Happens When Common PropertyBecomes Uncommon?, 80 BC Studies
3 (Winter 1988-89).
159. Emphasis on the symbiotic nature of human and environmental sustainability
is especially prevalent in the international development literature on natural resources;
see, e.g., N. Peluso, Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java
(1992).
160. See, e.g., Archer & Jarman, supra note 117, at 260, stating that the Magnuson Act
"clearly promoted public trust values." Sax, supra note 74, at 478, offers a more general
caution along these lines.
161. Cf. C. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property,53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711,722 (1986) ("the modern public trust doctrine is notoriously
vague" thus the need to turn to the traditional doctrine for "enlightenment"). The lack
of meaningful distinction between some contemporary characterizations of the public
trust doctrine and multiple use/public interest statutes has been noted by those offering
the characterizations; see Mantell, supra note 153, at 244-245.
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phasis on fiduciary duties coupled with maximization of public benefits is more characteristic of the so-called beneficial trust than of the
162
public trust doctrine.
Either fate is ironic for a doctrine thought to be vulnerable to
historical shackling 163 and death by constriction. 164 Rather than a strangulating appeal to original intent, the chief contemporary threat to the
public trust doctrine appears to be death by overstretching. The point
is not to argue for rigid original intent in applying public trust principles to the ITQ debate. To question the abandonment of attention to
distributional equity is not to argue for unbridled common use rights;
this would be as superficial a reading of the doctrine as an assertion
that alienation is absolutely prohibited.
CONCLUSIONS: THE NATURE OF A NATION
We are at once witnesses to a profound change in the perception of rights, and to little change in the progressive approach to natural resource management. Since Arnold v. Mundy we have moved from
finding great national principles at stake in the disposition of rights to
a few bushels of oysters to a barely concealed yawn at these same principles in terms of the disposition of rights to the entire halibut resource
off Alaska. At the same time, rather than confronting the fundamental
tensions between the tenets of scientific resource management and the
populist nature of American political institutions, we "choose merely
' " 165
to identify the[] opposition as 'selfish interests.
Fusing the debate over ITQs to the changing contours of the
public trust doctrine offers a commentary on the changing character of
a nation. A striking feature of the idea behind the classic trust doctrine,
the role of common use rights in mediating class relations through distributional equity, is that it underlies responses to great class challenges
of different epochs. Game laws were one of the defining elements of
class relations in medieval England. In nineteenth century America, the
same could be said for the transition to wage labor. In each age, the
base ideas of the doctrine responded. To what defining aspect of class
162. On the beneficial trust concept in natural resource management, see, S. Fairfax
et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 Envtl. L. 797 (1992);
J. Souder et al., State School Lands and Sustainable Resources Management: The Quest for
Guiding Principles,Nat. Res. J. Vol. 33, No. 4 (1993). As with the inherent privatization
associated with ITQs, this transformation of the public trust doctrine (towards a focus
on maximization of benefits) hints of an alignment between free market economists and
environmentalists.
163. Sax, supra note 75.
164. Sax, supra note 74, at 553. But see Sax, id. at 478, on the danger of conflation with

broad public interest.
165. See Hays, supra note 108, at 275; cf. supra text accompanying note 72.
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relations does the modern doctrine (and which doctrine at that) respond
today?
Finally, the road ahead for fisheries management from the public trust doctrine perspective lies not with a desiccating appeal to its
original intent. Nor does it lie with a continued blind embrace of structural panaceas at the expense of intellectual effort. Instead, we need to
face the large issues-those that define the character of the nationhead on. How can the central features of the old and the new public
trust doctrines be reconciled in order to promote both distributional
equity and environmental preservation? Have we changed so much as
a nation that we no longer have the capacity or will to ask?

